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Evolved mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity, which are evolutionary processes in their 
own right, enable species to respond adaptively to their environments. The Scandinavian 
countries and, in particular, Norway have for many years scored exceptionally high on lists of 
life quality, economic indicators, and measures of happiness. We propose that learning prosocial 
and cooperative behavior, which is central in a particular Norwegian cultural practice, dugnad, 
plays a role in the country’s success story. Dugnad is a Norwegian term for a type of voluntary 
work carried out as a community or collective and traditionally involving a social gathering. 
Dugnad has a long history in Norway, and it is a well-established cultural practice that has led to 
and still maintains significant social benefits. Dugnad is arranged in virtually all communities 
such as kindergartens, neighborhoods, schools, and organizations. Participation in dugnad 
gatherings is generally expected. Children from a young age are involved in dugnad. Dugnad 
activities are based on cooperation and can include anything from arranging a spring cleaning in 
the local community to building a club house for your children’s sports club. This paper 
discusses dugnad as a cultural practice that creates an environment that nurtures prosocial and 
cooperative activities. From a behavior analytic, selectionist perspective, we propose a non-
domain-specific learning mechanism for dugnad-typical prosocial and cooperative behavior 
analogous to the phylogenetic evolutionary mechanism of group selection. Contingencies can 
lead to and maintain dugnad activities when extended behavioral patterns are selected as wholes.  
 
 





Dugnad—A Fact and a Narrative of Norwegian Prosocial Behavior 
In 2017, Norway was granted the title “The Happiest Place to Live” (Helliwell, Layard, 
& Sachs, 2017). Norway has, for many years, scored exceptionally high on lists of life quality 
and economic indicators, such as the United Nations Human Development Index matrices (UN, 
2015). How and why have Norwegians achieved this? Scholars (Eklund, 2011; Witoszek & 
Midttun, 2018) explain Norway’s success with the so-called Nordic Model. The Nordic 
countries, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland are societies with both high 
economic productivity and an unequaled quality of life. Core elements of the Nordic Model are 
comprehensive social cooperation, economic governance, public welfare, and organized work. 
The economy is open with a high per capita income. All five countries have a rather large public 
sector, high taxes, and an inclusive welfare state with benefits such as free or affordable public 
services, health care, and education. Also, the Nordic countries have a strongly regulated labor 
market policy. Despite these similarities, the Nordics have different histories and unique 
structures (Witozsek & Midttun, 2018). Over the last years, international interest in the Nordic 
Model has rekindled (Eklund, 2011).  
The hallmarks of the Nordic cultures are their consistent and strong advocacy of the ideal 
of a cooperative, tolerant, and inclusive community, which is regarded as superior to a 
competitive, hierarchic culture (Witozsek & Midttun, 2018). Norway is one of the richest and 
most egalitarian democracies in the world. No doubt, the oil resources have played a major role 
in accumulating wealth, but the reason that the Nordic model generates so much research interest 
(e.g., Christiansen, 2006; Dølvik, 2013; Greve, 2007; Hilson, 2008; Knutsen, 2017; Kvist, 2012; 
Midttun et al., 2011; Simon, 2017; Wilson & Hessen, 2018) is the proposition that also high 




The question motivating many analyses of the Nordic Model is whether other countries could 
benefit from an implementation of its characteristics. Cultural and social values are not easily 
transferable across borders (Eklund, 2011), but behavior analysts may foster such transfer by use 
of their tools and knowledge allowing them to perform functional analysis on a cultural level 
(Couto & Sandaker, 2016).  
Wilson, Hayes, Biglan, and Embry (2014) argue that evolution must be at the center of 
any science of change given that the study of evolution is the study of how organisms change in 
relation to environmental events. Thus, they conclude, in line with the ideas that form the basis 
of Skinner’s (1948) novel Walden Two, that we need to become wise managers of evolutionary 
processes selecting behavior to avoid unmanaged processes taking us where we would prefer not 
to go. Walden Two portrays a world combining the best of both Paleolithic and modern culture 
(Glenn, 1988). The novel illustrates that the evolutionary processes selecting behavior that we 
are to be aware of include those occurring at a phylogenetic level, and those we are to manage 
include those on an ontogenetic and a cultural level. Skinner portrays, in particular, the potential 
of managing the ubiquitous selection of behavior during ontogeny, which is not to be confused 
with eugenics, a set of practices attempting to improve the genetic quality of the human 
population by artificial breeding of—what its proponents regard to be—superior genetic groups 
(Galton, 1904).  
Natural selection is based on relative fitness. Hence, the behavior that maximizes the 
fitness of individuals, relative to members of their group, is often different from the behavior that 
maximizes the fitness of the group as a whole. The arising conflict between self-interest and 
behaving for the good of the group has occupied evolutionary biologists since the 1960s. These 




relying on many groups that successfully manage their common pool resources. On the other 
hand, they point to the vulnerability of these groups to self-interested defectors. Wilson and 
Hessen (2014) proposed a solution of this conflict between self-interest and mutual benefits by 
suggesting that the social dynamics that take place naturally and spontaneously in smaller groups 
can be scaled up to prevent the ethical transgressions that routinely take place at larger scales. 
Wilson and Hessen (2014) summarize their view as follows: 
The success of the so-called “Nordic Model” is commonly attributed to factors such as 
income equality, a high level of trust, and high willingness to pay tax, which is tightly 
coupled to strong social security (health, education), a blend of governmental regulations 
and capitalism, and cultural homogeneity. These and other factors are important, but we 
think that viewing them through an evolutionary lens is likely to shed light on why they 
are important. Our hypothesis is that Norway functions well as a nation because it has 
successfully managed to scale up the social control mechanisms that operate 
spontaneously in village-sized groups. Income equality, trust, and the other factors 
attributed to Norway’s success emanate from the social control mechanisms […] The 
most strongly regulated groups in the world are small groups, thanks to countless 
generations of genetic and cultural evolution that make us the trusting and cooperative 
species that we are. The idea that trust requires social control is paradoxical because 
social control is not trusting. Nevertheless, social control creates an environment in which 
trust can flourish. When we know that others cannot harm us, thanks to a strong system 
of social controls, then we can express our positive emotions and actions toward others to 




In the search for the causes of Norwegian well-being, this evolutionary perspective 
suggests turning the spotlight to the traditions of cooperation, reflected in a particular Norwegian 
cultural practice—dugnad ['dʉ:gnɑd]—which has been central to the development of the welfare 
society. In their reflections on Witozsek and Midttun’s (2018) edited volume on the Nordic 
Model, Kildal and Bjerke (2018) write that Nordic  
knowledge and thinking have created inbuilt reflexes of cooperation in the Nordic 
societies. The tradition of cooperation, for instance, reflected in the Norwegian institution 
dugnad, has been central to the creation of the Nordic welfare societies.1  
Even if Kildal and Bjerke (2018), who do not have a background in a behavioral science, 
use the term reflex technically inappropriately—possibly metaphorically or as an exaggeration—
they deserve credit for explicitly drawing attention to the very connection between well-being 
and cooperation in Norway and the cultural practice of dugnad, which we discuss further.  
The main dictionary of the Norwegian written language Bokmål, Bokmålsordboka, 
describes the heritage of the Norwegian word dugnad as an amalgamation of duge and the suffix 
nad. Duge means “to be good enough” or “useful,” while nad corresponds to the Latin atus that 
is suffixed to a noun to designate passive qualities. The term dugnad refers to a sort of voluntary 
work done as a community or collective. Traditionally, dugnad is a way of solving local,2 
common tasks by means of collective efforts from the community. 
The cultures of the Scandinavian nations Denmark, Sweden, and Norway are so similar 
that Scandinavians moving between these countries are not regarded as immigrants to the same 
 
 
1 Online source without page numbers that we edited for grammar. 





extent as immigrants from other countries. Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish are mutually 
understandable, overlapping in much of their vocabulary. Reference to “different languages” is 
politically motivated; from a linguistic perspective, they are dialects. However, dugnad is a 
Norwegian word lacking understandability and counterparts in any other language, including 
Swedish and Danish. In 2004, the Norwegian national broadcasting service (NRK), elected 
dugnad as ”Norway’s National word of the year” in their TV series Typisk norsk (engl. 
“Typically Norwegian”). Researchers (e.g., Kraglund & Enjolras, 2017; Lorentzen & Dugstad, 
2011) agree on the importance and uniqueness of dugnad in Norwegian culture, but there is little 
documentation of the development of this cultural practice. Sometimes, dugnad and voluntary 
work are used interchangeably, but there are distinctions between the two terms. Traditionally, 
the core elements of dugnad are 1) unpaid work, 2) people meet face-to-face, and 3) they join in 
tasks with a defined start and end point. Work is followed by 4) a social gathering such as a meal 
(Lorentzen & Dugstad, 2011). Not all voluntary work is dugnad, in the sense that not all 
voluntary work needs to be face to face or include a social happening (Lorentzen & Dugstad, 
2011).  
Participants in dugnads engage in prosocial behavior, which Biglan (2015) defined as 
“behaviors that benefit individuals and those around them”3 (p. 16) and as consisting of 
“behaviors […] that have to do with helping others, contributing to the community [ …, are] 
associated with greater personal well-being [, and are] beneficial to the group” (Wilson et al., 
2014, p. 445). Biglan (2015) and Biglan, Flay, Embry, and Sandler (2012) put forward that 
promoting and reinforcing prosocial behavior is one of the ways in which interventions make 
 
 
3 We wittingly omit “a constellation of values [and] attitudes” (Biglan, 2015, p.16), which are part of both 




environments more nurturing. That is, fostering our successful development and preventing the 
development of psychological and behavioral problems. Dugnad may be understood as a means 
of realizing nurturing environments that fuel prosocial behavior in Norway. Systems and policies 
that have proved to work well might serve as an inspiration for others (Eklund, 2011).  
If the tradition of dugnad plays a role in Norway’s success, it solicits the questions How? 
and Why? If all human behavior is a function of environmental events that have occurred during 
the history of our species and environmental events we experience during our lifetime, how and 
why do people who live in a “dugnad society” behave differently from those who do not?  
By discussing the Norwegian cultural practice of dugnad, this paper exemplifies how 
traditions can be understood from a behavior analytic perspective and how such understanding 
may guide action. Dugnad is a cultural practice in the sense that culture consists of behavior 
patterns acquired as a result of group membership (Boyd & Richerson, 1985), and that practices 
are behavioral patterns that are not idiosyncratically acquired by individuals. Thus, these 
behavioral patterns are available for replication—for example, contrary to Dawkins’ (1982) 
dead-end replicators (Baum, 2000). Skinner (1981) suggested that the unit of culture is a 
contingency of social reinforcement (i.e., arranged by other people) that is characteristic for a 
group. In this paper, we attempt to investigate dugnad as a unit of culture by discussing its social 
context and socially mediated consequences. First, we suggest a historical account of a cultural 
practice that has led to and maintained significant social benefits. Second, we propose behavioral 
processes that support the cultural practice of dugnad. Different from the perspective expressed 
by the biologists Wilson and Hessen (2014) in the quote above, we argue that an outline of the 




exclusively on genetic and cultural evolution, and is incomplete without an outline of the role of 
the selection of behavior during an individual’s lifetime. 
 Skinner (1981) argued that behavior change might be caused by selection processes at 
three levels: genetic, operant, and cultural. In this paper, we attempt to fill that gap created by 
analyses limited to genetic and cultural selection of prosocial behavior. After all, the three levels 
of selection are interdependent. As Skinner (1981) pointed out, the “operant condition is an 
evolved process, of which cultural practices are special applications” (p. 502), and operant and 
cultural selection processes ultimately need to be adaptive from a natural selection point of view. 
The question about which adaptive function dugnad may perform translates to the questions of 
what is learned and why this might be useful. To be beneficial, behavioral patterns must make 
contact with consequences that affect the copying of genes, which we will discuss in Baum’s 
(2012) terminology of Phylogenetically Important Events.  
In this present contribution to the special section of Perspectives on Behavior Science: 
Cultural and Behavioral Systems Science, we discuss how operant selection may contribute to 
bringing about the cultural practice of dugnad. We discuss this interdependence of operant and 
cultural phenomena by broaching that consequences (Baum’s PIEs) may be produced by 1) 
several people together, which Glenn (2004) termed cumulative effects or aggregate products 
(Glenn et al., 2016), 2) temporally extended behavioral patterns correlating with long-term 
consequences, and 3) short-term social consequences, which are effective due to our long history 
of living in groups. Because long-term consequences have little effect on behavior, an adaptive 
practice—that is, a practice that pays in the long run—is strengthened in the short term by social 
reinforcers delivered by rule-givers. A behavioral analysis focuses on environmental events that 




this refers to such observable adaptive practices, which pay in the long run (Baum, 1995; 
Rachlin, 2004). This includes what Borba, Tourinho, and Glenn (2014) term ethical self-control, 
denoting situations in which “a person’s behavior produces long-term consequences to many 
members of the culture […and where] the delayed effect is central to the definition” (p. 69). 
In this paper, we explore how this dynamic of the effects of long-term and short-term 
consequences on behavior can contribute to the maintenance of and the threat to dugnad-
practices. The susceptibility of behavior to all three ways of contacting consequences enables the 
formation of extended patterns, extended in an individuals’ time or across several individuals, 
such as when participating in dugnad activities. This paper suggests that these are how operant 
selection maintains dugnad activities.   
In the following, we first provide a primer to the history of dugnad and then outline our 
understanding of the workings of operant selection in initiating and maintaining dugnad activities 
by interpreting this cultural practice in the light of a behavioral analysis of prosociality, self-
control, and altruism, before concluding with final remarks.  
The History of Dugnad 
Norway has a long tradition of dugnad in terms of unpaid voluntary work where people 
gather to accomplish a task often involving manual labor that requires many workers (Beier, 
2011; Klepp, 2001). Dugnad is based on egalitarian relationships among the participants. Today, 
dugnads are scheduled in almost all community contexts such as in kindergartens, 
neighborhoods, schools, and sports clubs. When you are informed about a dugnad, the other 
participants generally expect you to participate and to spend time contributing to the common 
good of the community. Dugnad activities today range from baking a cake for your children’s 




often follows the utilitarian event. For example, a barbeque or waffles and coffee gathering may 
follow indoor and outdoor spring-cleaning in housing cooperatives. 
The origin of dugnad dates back to a broad period from the beginning of Christianity to 
the 19th century (e.g., Lenk, 2011; Lorentzen & Dugstad, 2011). According to the Institute for 
Social Research in Norway, dugnad activities can be traced back to rural communities of the 14th 
and 15th centuries. Voluntary organizations later adopted dugnad as they emerged after the 1850s 
(Institute for Social Research, 2008).  
Likely, special Norwegian conditions such as the spread settlement in a landscape with 
fjords, forests, and mountains led to the growth of small isolated communities that favored the 
development of the dugnad tradition. Because they lived in small and detached villages, people 
depended largely on one another’s help. In contrast to Sweden, for example, nobility has been 
almost nonexistent in Norway. This may have fostered a culture of emphasizing equality and 
social democracy that has nurtured the dugnad practice. Norway has a long history of relatively 
small social differences. Long before oil was discovered, the population was relatively poor. 
With little or no money to share with others, people instead contributed work power. Dugnad 
activities were often limited to small communities, and in the 19th century, dugnad was an 
important part of farming (Lenk, 2011). Members of the community joined forces to help each 
other with work they could not accomplish alone. Actions were voluntary and collective. They 
did not necessarily result in any tangible benefit for the individual apart from a meal served by 
the host at the end of the dugnad. Farming was based on reciprocity, and non-cooperative 
farmers could not expect any help in return. Farmers were dependent on each other.  
In 1905, after becoming independent of Sweden, Norway was one of Europe’s poorest 




cooperation between employers and the Labor Party was signed in 1935. This agreement is still 
the backbone of Norwegian economic life and represents the union of traditional egalitarian 
individualism and communal values (Haugestad, 2003).  
After the Second World War, Norway had a large housing shortage, and the country 
needed to be rebuilt and modernized. This became a national dugnad initiated by the Labor Party 
led by Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen. He was soon nicknamed the “dugnad general.” In the 
years after 1945, the Parliament reached a consensus that aimed at enabling people to build and 
own homes. The strategy was based on joint voluntary work, with the state providing affordable 
bank loans, the municipality providing reasonably priced land, and the private sector working 
through co-operatives pulling together to overcome the housing crisis. The homeowners 
contributed by maintaining their buildings together to reduce cost and to sustain social 
relationships through dugnad. The long-lasting Norwegian tradition of dugnad, which people 
were familiar with from farming, now flourished in the context of house building.  
The more that the welfare state took over the responsibility for people’s well-being, the 
more dugnad practices entailed civil engagement beyond the sphere of government and the 
profit-based business community (Lorentzen & Dugstad, 2011). With the emergence of the 
welfare state and increased regulations and quality requirements for solving tasks in the 
communities, it became more difficult to rely on the work of amateurs. Through history, dugnad 
has had diverse forms and has not been limited to small groups such as a sports team or an 
apartment block. Politicians and other authorities or organizations call for dugnads to mobilize 
the Norwegian people in one direction or another. Rebuilding the country after the Second World 
War is one example. Another example is that the Norwegian Food Safety Authority wanted 




politicians to homeowners, were mobilized through an information and media campaign to 
implement preventive measures—chemical, biological, and mechanical—to reduce the 
population of the Iberian slug. As this example did not involve a scheduled gathering for 
common physical work followed by a social event, it shows how modern dugnad is adapting in a 
changing world.  
Despite deep historical roots, dugnad, like any other cultural practice, evolves due to 
environmental changes. Over the past few decades, modern technology has had a huge impact on 
civil society. Globalization and new technology make it possible to engage across borders and 
national conditions, and boundaries between states, markets, and societies are being broken 
down. Modernization brings along incremental individualization that fundamentally changes the 
relationships between civil societies and their organizations. Dugnad adapts to modernity and 
finds new expressions, which we discuss in the section Status Quo of Dugnad. First, we propose 
an explanation of how prosocial behavior, such as dugnad participation, may have evolved. 
Ontogenetic Selection of Behavior 
Had our behavior changed only by means of natural selection, we would be in trouble as 
soon as we face an environment that does not match our ancestral environment. Learning, or 
behavior change during our lifetime, is risky. If behavior is not innate, maladaptive behavior may 
be acquired. However, when learning is beneficial on average and in the long run, for example, 
when the environment changes, genes for learning are selected. These genes make our behavior 
susceptible to events that occur during our lifetime. This means that natural selection has brought 
about another selection process, a process that allows our behavior to change as a consequence of 




Phylogenetically Important Events—The Drivers of Ontogenetic Evolution 
Our environment changes all the time, but not all environmental changes influence our 
behavior. During the history of our species, those individuals whose behavior changed when 
contacting food, predators, warmth, mates, and so on contributed more to the next generation’s 
gene pool than those whose behavior was less affected by such events. This means that those 
whose behavior changed as a function of contact with certain events had higher biological 
fitness. Baum (2012) called these events, which affect safety, nutrition, shelter, and ultimately—
and on average—reproductive success, Phylogenetically Important Events (PIEs). PIEs acquired 
the effect they have on behavior today in the course of phylogeny, that is, the history of the 
species. To put it in Skinner’s (1981) terms, the reinforcing or punishing function of certain 
events is naturally selected. A PIE, such as the occurrence of a predator, is “phylogenetically 
important” in the sense that it affects fitness. Thus, susceptibility of behavior to such events was 
passed on as a genetic setup that enables operant learning. Those whose behavior did not change 
(e.g., from foraging to escaping) when a predator appeared (PIE) were less likely to reproduce 
and to pass on their ignorance of predators to descendants.  
Selection by Contingencies 
A contingency between behavior and PIEs selects behavior during ontogeny because the 
affectability of behavior by such events has been advantageous for fitness in the organism’s 
phylogeny. A contingency between two events, such as behavior and a PIE, exists when the 
probability of event A depends on event B (Baum, 2012; Rescorla, 1968, 1988). These events 
may either coincide or occur at different points in time, but for behavior to become susceptible to 
a probability of events, there need to be several occurrences of the events. This makes accidental 




probability of, say, being praised is the same regardless of performance, then no contingency 
exists between praise and performance. Thus, praise would not select performance. The temporal 
relation between the two events influences the susceptibility of behavior to the contingency. 
Hence, a contingency relates or connects behavioral and environmental events. It links a PIE to 
an activity and results in an increase or decrease in the activity. Contingencies between activities 
and PIEs are ubiquitous.  
Cross-generational selection of organisms can occur naturally (as in the evolution of 
wolves), or artificially (as in breeding dogs). Equivalently, selection of behavior during ontogeny 
occurs naturally, as when searching for mushrooms in certain areas, contrary to other areas, goes 
along with finding mushrooms. It can also occur artificially, as when we swap the position of the 
mushrooms and the steak at a buffet to nudge people’s filling up their plates with mushrooms 
before getting to the steak (Mobekk, Karevold, Tran, & Stjernen, 2018). 
Some events do not affect fitness directly but tend to co-occur or correlate with events 
that affect fitness. Money, for example, correlates with resources; smiles correlate with safety or 
with mating opportunities. Even these proxies of PIEs can affect behavior during our lifetime. As 
humans have largely evolved living in groups (Diamond, 2012), many of these events are social 
(Richerson & Boyd, 2005). When people cooperate, their common behavior pattern can produce 
advantageous PIEs that each individual’s behavior could not have produced. Glenn (2003, 2004) 




produced by the behavior of one organism from those produced by several organisms together.4 
Dugnad is a cultural practice characterized by such cooperative behavior. 
Together, dugnad participants show a behavioral pattern that correlates with PIEs. Each 
individual’s behavior would not have produced these PIEs alone. For example, a dugnad in a 
rowing club usually involves maintenance of large boats and their storage space. One person 
alone cannot move the boats, but a group easily achieves relocation of the boats required for their 
maintenance. All group members will eventually benefit from well-maintained boats and storage 
space. Consequences to the group as a whole can select the group’s practice (Biglan & Glenn, 
2013). Other PIEs such as a lower danger of infection by removing rusty nails from children’s 
play areas or removing other dirt from common areas could, in theory, have been produced by a 
single individual’s more extended work. However, correlations with other PIE-proxies, such as 
money, would have to be in place to induce someone’s spending a week cleaning on their own 
instead of engaging in a dugnad lasting for one evening and entailing PIE-proxies such as social 
interactions. Activities compete for an organism’s time, and the outcome of this competition is 
decided by the correlation between the activity and a PIE or PIE-proxy (Baum, 2016). The 
correlation between clean common areas (in addition to social PIEs) and a few hours of cleaning 
 
 
4 Further vocabulary that Glenn et al. (2016) have specifically developed for describing cultural selection 
processes includes metacontingency, macrobehavior, macrocontingency, culturo-behavioral lineage, 
culturant and cultural cusp. Our analyses are compatible with processes that might describe such a 
cultural level of selection (see Krispin, 2016; 2017, for an application of the metacontingency 
vocabulary). However, a conceptualization of dugnad as a result of cultural level selection in terms of 
metacontingencies would here distract from our goal to outline the contribution of natural and operant 
selection to the cultural practice of dugnad. An analysis in terms of these cultural selection concepts 
seems inept for our present purposes of 1) discussing the contribution of operant selection of less-
extended acts to the maintenance of the cultural practice of dugnad and 2) suggesting that, in dugnad 
participation, both selection of temporally extended behavior of individuals and that produced by several 




may select cleaning and outcompete alternative evening activities. The correlation between a 
week’s lonesome cleaning and a clean common area, however, does not outcompete alternative 
activities such as paid work or relaxing spare-time activities.  
Dugnad goes along with trust, which plays an essential role in the Nordic Model. 
Behavior that we call trusting fosters prosocial collective arrangements (Witozsek & Midttun, 
2018). Even if most movements to preserve human freedom aim at limiting punitive means for 
influencing behavior (Skinner, 1972), social control creates the conditions in which trust can 
thrive (Wilson & Hessen, 2014). To cooperate often means to invest without being sure that the 
others will invest too, which can be a prerequisite to ensure that your behavior will lead to PIEs. 
If you grew up in a society where paying taxes does not correlate strongly with PIEs such as 
good infrastructure, you are less likely to pay taxes. If you experience that mostly PIEs that are 
advantageous for your health, child care, or safety correlate with you paying taxes—and evading 
taxes leads to disadvantageous social PIE-proxies such as disapproval by your friends, you are 
more likely to pay your taxes than if you have reason to believe that your money will be 
embezzled (a disadvantageous PIE). 
In Norway, trust in the state, businesses, and other people is high (Berggren & Trägårdh, 
2011; Edlund, 1999). Smaller class differences generally tend to go along with lower levels of 
criminality and corruption. The average Norwegian is not likely to have experienced major 
disappointments as a consequence of trusting, for example, in the government’s promises on how 
taxes will be used. Participation in direct debit, which allows companies to withdraw money you 
owe them directly from your bank account, is among the highest in Norway (European-Central-
Bank, 2015). If you do not have to be afraid of misuse, giving others access to your bank account 




community members avoiding dugnad participation and, thus, not doing their fair share of the 
activity required for bringing about the (shared) PIE, you are also more likely to freeload, 
especially if this is not followed by withdrawal of social approval or punishment (Rachlin & 
Locey, 2011). In the following, we put forward an analysis of naturally occurring contingencies 
between PIEs and dugnad activities, which can guide the design of new contingencies fostering 
cooperative and prosocial behavior.  
Contingencies Selecting Participation in Dugnad 
Following Rachlin and Locey’s (2011) thesis that altruistic behavior can be 
ontogenetically selected, we propose that their arguments also apply to cooperative or prosocial 
behavior of organisms, an example of which is participation in dugnad.5 The dynamics of dugnad 
parallel in many ways the so-called tragedy of the commons scenarios that come about when 
individuals overuse a common resource. Whereas the ecologist G. Hardin (1968) phrased tragedy 
of the common scenarios in terms of individuals’ “taking too much,” problems with dugnad 
contributions arise if people are “not giving enough.” “Taking too much” and “not giving 
enough” amount to the same conflict, whose dynamics behavior analyst H. Rachlin has modeled 
extensively using multi-person prisoner dilemma games (e.g., Rachlin & Locey, 2011). Behavior 
that creates a tragedy of the commons (such as driving instead of using public transport,) is 
selected and controlled by the contingencies between an individual’s choice (to drive) and PIEs, 
but it has a cumulative effect (such as traffic jams; Glenn, 2004).  
 
 
5 We regard so-called altruistic behavior and prosocial or cooperative behavior as gradually different in 
their cost-benefit distribution and in the temporal distance between the cost and the benefit, but not as 
different in kind. Prosocial and altruistic behavior would be categorically different only if altruistic 
behavior were defined as non-reinforced behavior—a definition that would defy behavior analysis 




Tragedy of the commons scenarios, such as those of over-pollution leading the world into 
a climate crisis, emerge if people do “the opposite” from what they do in dugnad participation. 
This underlines the potential impact an increase of dugnad typical prosocial behavior could have. 
Here, we propose an explanation of how organisms can learn to cooperate and to behave 
prosocially. This explanation relies neither on a special inherited altruistic tendency, as proposed 
by Wilson and Sober (1998), nor on an innate sense of fairness, as proposed by Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2003).6 Instead, the crucial inherited tendency maintaining participation in dugnad 
activities is the same that enables the formation of other patterns of self-controlled behavior: the 
sensitivity of temporally extended patterns of behavior to PIEs (Baum, 2018; Rachlin & Locey, 
2011; Simon, 2016; Simon & Hessen, 2019). If potential parts of extended patterns enter into a 
contingency with relatively immediate social PIEs, this helps to build the pattern that PIEs then 
can maintain as a whole. Even if an individual prosocial act, say cleaning the bathrooms of your 
sports club (as part of your dugnad participation) instead of going to the movies (as part of 
skipping dugnad participation), correlates with disadvantageous PIEs, an advantageous PIE can 
act on the whole pattern of which this act (cleaning) is a part. The whole dugnad evening or your 
pattern of regular dugnad participations correlates with access to a well-functioning affordable 
sports club, positive social interactions, absence of negative social interactions, and with being 
able wholeheartedly to call yourself a good person. However, to agree to show up to clean the 
bathrooms (as part of a more extended pattern) may constitute a self-controlled act just like 
refusing a dessert if you are on a diet (see Rachlin, 1995; Rachlin, 2004; Rachlin & Green, 1972, 
 
 
6 This is not to claim that inheritance of altruistic tendencies is impossible or to deny that babies are more 
likely to reinforce the behavior of a person they have observed to cooperate (which Biglan, 2015, uses as 
evidence of “wired-in tendencies” (p. 16)). However, here we would like to spread hope by outlining how 




for a non-mentalistic account of self-control and Borba, Tourinho & Glenn, 2014, 2017 for a 
behavior analytic approach to ethical self-control). The extended diffuse consequences (say 
access to an affordable socially pleasant sports club or losing weight, respectively) compete with 
more immediate and concrete consequences (smell and sight of a disgusting bathroom or the 
pleasant taste of a dessert) for control of your behavior (Locey et al., 2013). This is why eating a 
healthier diet, stopping smoking and drinking, and getting people to engage in more prosocial 
behavior such as participation in dugnad, is not easy—though it is often possible. There are 
sooner consequences for parts of these behavior patterns (withdrawal symptoms after refusing a 
drink, having a relaxing evening after refusing to participate in a dugnad versus social approval 
for refusing a drink or participating in a dugnad) as well as more delayed consequences for the 
more extended behavioral pattern (good health, a well-functioning inexpensive sport’s club 
versus their absence). These different consequences compete for our time, challenging the 
development and maintenance of self-controlled, prosocial behavioral patterns. Understanding 
the power of these sooner and more extended consequences caries the potential to influence 
choice in a way that prosocial behavior patterns can be built. 
Baum (2013, 2016) put forward that activities with different levels of complexity may be 
selected as wholes. Parallel to Wilson and Sober’s (1998) phylogenetic multi-level selection 
model, the units of selection in Baum’s ontogenetic multi-scale model are nested into each other. 
Despite these similarities, the possibility of phylogenetic group selection, which is widely 
disputed (Krasnow & Delton, 2016; Krasnow, Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2015; Richerson et 
al., 2015; West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007), and selection of behavioral patterns do not depend on 
each other. Extended behavioral patterns may be selected as wholes even if the possibility of 




eating, sleeping, or sexual activity is often patterned, and ontogenetic selection can evolve them 
into new forms (Locey & Rachlin, 2015; Rachlin, 1995; Teitelbaum, 1977). Since the 1960s, 
researchers have accumulated evidence suggesting that patterns of responses can be selected by 
PIEs as whole units. Wolff (1968) found that infants do not alter pauses between individual 
sucks but between bursts of sucks, that is, groups of sucks as wholes. Grunow and Neuringer 
(2002) and Neuringer (2004) created contingencies that selected sequences of rats’ lever presses 
as wholes. Studies on commitment and self-control with both human and non-human subjects 
show that organisms increase patterning if increased access to advantageous PIEs is contingent 
on patterning.  
How do the dynamics of selection of behavioral patterns help to illuminate why 
Norwegians every so often spend their Sunday afternoon freezing, standing next to a skiing track 
waiting for the end of a children’s skiing competition instead of at their cozy fireplace? To 
understand why someone may choose to engage in an activity that will (proximately) lead to 
disadvantageous PIEs instead of alternative activities that may (proximately) lead to 
advantageous PIEs, it is important to consider that every choice occurs within a context. A 
decision for or against participation in dugnad does not occur in a vacuum. Having grown up in 
Norway, you are likely to have started to gather experiences with dugnad from early childhood, 
which you did not do if you moved to Norway at a later age. However, independent of your 
dugnad-specific experiences, you are likely to have experienced situations with similar 
dynamics. You may have experienced that you get to work quicker if you are one of the few 
people driving, whereas everybody else uses public transport, even though everyone goes slower 
when everyone chooses to drive. You may have heard about emergencies where you are quickest 




did so, all would get out more slowly. Maybe you have experienced other situations where it was 
best for you as an individual if you, and (almost) only you, add more to pollution, use more 
energy, jump queues, break agreements, be the soldier who turns and runs or be the peasant who 
has more children using overcrowded land. All these experiences build the context for the 
likelihood of your prosocial behavior in a dugnad context, such as contributing to a children’s 
skiing competition on one of your scarce free Sunday afternoons. 
Borba et al. (2014) investigated individuals’ choices in concurrent contingencies 
involving conflicts of consequences for the individual and consequences for the group. 
Individuals had to choose between options producing advantageous individual consequences and 
disadvantageous group consequences and vice versa. Participants made their choices either alone 
or in the presence of other group members, where they could either access each other’s choices 
or not, and where group members could either talk to each other or not. Being able to talk to each 
other increased unselfish choices (benefitting the group rather than the individual) more than 
merely seeing what the others chose. Although Borba et al. did not analyze what participants said 
to each other, they interpreted the increase in unselfish choices when verbal communication was 
possible to support Skinner’s (1953) proposal that verbal behavior can function as an immediate 
consequence maintaining behavior when other consequences are delayed. Borba et al. assume 
that other participant’s verbal behavior may have reinforced self-controlled choices, that is, 
choices that are advantageous for the group. Borba et al. also suggest that their participants made 
more self-controlled choices when talking because verbal communication helps individuals to 
predict what other people will do (Brown & Rachlin, 1999; Rachlin, 2004). Presumably, the 




Applied to dugnad participation, the results of Borba et al. (2014) make it likely that 
verbal PIE-proxies are sooner consequences that aid in building the more extended self-
controlled pattern of participation in dugnad. Partly, the participation is reinforced later by the 
dugnad’s concrete aggregate product. Partly, it is reinforced by the more diffuse tightening of 
social bonds, a part of which is an increase in the likelihood that the other participants will 
reciprocate in the future. Having grown up in a dugnad society, you have experienced that social 
approval, inclusion, explicit reciprocity, and the shared outcome of the dugnad event are 
advantageous PIEs that are, in the long run, in a contingency with your prosocial behavior, of 
which dugnad participation is a central part. Accordingly, you have learned that defectors or 
freeloaders contact disadvantageous PIEs. The driver passing the traffic jam in the bus lane is 
punished, and the fisherperson who consistently overfishes is shunned by the other fisherpersons. 
Over time, people learn to recognize situations in which it is advantageous to cooperate because 
the pattern of cooperation is often selected by advantageous PIEs, even if individual cooperative 
acts, say, participation in a particular dugnad event, may lead to aversive PIEs. An example of 
this would be spending a cold and dark Sunday afternoon helping out at your child’s skiing race 
instead of relaxing at the fireplace with your family.   
Rachlin and Locey (2011) have proposed another reason why self-controlled behavior, 
such as participation in dugnads, can develop and be maintained. They put forward that it might 
not be beneficial in the long run to attempt fine discriminations between situations in which 
cooperation ultimately leads to advantageous PIEs and those in which it does not. Most of us do 
not shop-lift or drive past red traffic lights, independent of how small the chance is that we will 
be caught. In most dugnad contexts, participation is not anonymous but well observed by the 




that people tend to engage in considerably more prosocial behavior (forgo more hypothetical 
money for the benefit of others) when the receivers know the giver’s identity. Today, social 
media are used to draw even more attention to who contributed to dugnads, ensuring the 
effectiveness of social control mechanisms. 
According to Wilson’s group selection supposition (Wilson, 1975, 2015; Wilson & 
Kniffin, 1999), which is part of his multilevel selection theory, selfish individuals outcompete 
altruistic or cooperative individuals, but altruistic groups outcompete selfish groups. Altruistic or 
cooperative dugnad group activities can make for the success of the group, but selfish freeloaders 
threaten these group activities. Freeloaders who do not participate in the house cooperative’s 
spring-cleaning would still get access to the advantageous PIEs that the group’s activities 
produced. If no contingency that ensures that freeloading is punished by disadvantageous PIEs 
such as social disproval, fines, or exclusion from further access to the group benefits is in place, 
selfish behavior will eventually outcompete cooperative behavior (Wilson, 2015). 
Disadvantageous PIEs need to correlate with selfish behavior to maintain cooperation.  
Problems arise when dugnad provides advantageous PIEs that are in a contingency with 
selfish behavior. If people place their washing machines in front of the emergency exit instead of 
disposing of them properly and rely upon (other’s) dugnad activity to remove them, this will 
lower the likelihood that other community members will participate in future dugnads. If you 
both have to carry a washing machine and (just like everyone else living in the building) have to 
pay for the skip in which the washing machine is disposed of, you are unlikely to be fond of 




selfish behavior.7 According to group selection theory (Wilson, 1975), cooperative groups 
outcompete selfish groups. This suggests that society would benefit from minimizing freeloading 
to ensure that no one takes unfair advantage of the collective efforts of others. To be sure, 
prosocial behavior may be fostered by a variety of interventions not resembling dugnad, but in 
Norway, dugnad traditionally provides a significant context in which children grow up learning 
to engage in prosocial activities.  
As mentioned briefly at the beginning of this section, dugnad participation is influenced 
not only by the behavior of others (say shunning or appreciation by neighbors or other sports 
club members contingent on your dugnad participation). Dugnad participation is also influenced 
by our behavior in similar situations. If I have a history of contacting advantageous PIEs 
contingent on prosocial behavior, I am unlikely to break this pattern even if nothing signals a 
beneficial cost-benefit relation between my participating in a particular dugnad and PIEs. Now, 
my dugnad participation is part of a larger pattern of self-controlled behavior just like brushing 
my teeth twice a day and stopping at red lights even if no cars are coming. It is easier to reflect 
upon my behavior pattern (“I am a good person”) than to take all choices on an individual basis. 
Moreover, previous choices in individual situations might have proven disadvantageous, and 
their negative consequences (being hit by a car) are much more serious than the costs involved in 




7 Note that paying your share for the skip is independent of your actual dugnad participation. Carrying the 
washing machine is part of participation, but both activities are independent of whether it was you who 




Given dugnads are voluntary per definition, Norwegian law does not enforce dugnad 
attendance. Organizations and housing cooperatives are not allowed to fine or fee those members 
who do not participate in dugnad work. Because no one is legally obliged to participate in 
dugnad, one cannot be legally punished either. Widespread participation is expected, though, and 
dugnad participation is perceived as a vital part of belonging to neighborhoods, organizations, 
and workplaces. This expectation is manifested in the availability or non-availability of social 
PIE-proxies such as gratefulness, welcoming words, or smiles. On a long-term basis, non-
participation is socially unacceptable. The shared meal topping off virtually all traditional 
dugnad events may be an important factor inducing participation. Access to pleasant and 
convenient shared meals could itself be a social PIE-proxy selecting behavior. Such behavior 
may include dugnad participation upon which the shared meal—and, thus, the food and pleasant 
interactions—are contingent. 
Jones and Rachlin’s (2009) experiments on public good games show that the closer you 
feel to other people, may they be your relatives or not, the more likely you are to cooperate with 
them or to choose options not immediately advantageous for you but those that are advantages to 
the group to which you and the others belong. It is easy to imagine that one feels closer to one’s 
neighbors after a collective spring cleaning topped off with a barbeque evening than when just 
having passed them in the stairwell. Likely, you have talked to each other during the dugnad, 
which appears to increase the likelihood of prosocial acts towards each other (as in Borba et al., 
2014, described above). In sum, not only the aggregate product of a clean building but also being 
more familiar with each other after a dugnad may induce future participation in dugnads and, 




Status Quo of Dugnad 
Norway, like the rest of the Western world, is a society in fast transformation. It is 
evolving from an industrial society to a postmodern society, which leads to changes in relations 
between civil groups and individuals. Western societies are changing from caring local citizens 
to global consumers. Along with that, people’s willingness to engage in voluntary collective 
work such as dugnad has declined (Lenk, 2011). The essence of dugnad, reflected in the 
egalitarian Norwegian culture, is a consensus that everyone, independent of income or heritage, 
participates. Everybody benefits from dugnad activities, but in the long run, it is disadvantageous 
for every individual to contribute significantly more than others. According to the Institute for 
Social Research (2008), there are three trends in modern society that have an impact on 
participation in dugnad: individualization, the emergence of the social network community, and 
increasing cultural diversity. The standard of living in Norway has changed dramatically since 
the post-war period. Norwegians are no longer directly dependent on each other. The matching 
relation (Baum, 1974; Herrnstein, 1970) would predict that if more activities are competing for 
an individual’s time today, the “payoff” of dugnad participation (the cost-benefit relation of PIE-
proxies resulting from dugnad participation) needs to be proportionally more favorable as well. 
Otherwise, dugnad participation will decrease. Over time, people tend to participate when the 
cost of contribution is less than the cost of the non-cooperative behavioral pattern. The cost of 
dugnad contribution is experienced immediately, whereas the cost of non-contribution is more 
remote and often less concrete. If the selective pressure on groups of acts (dugnad participation 
in the long run) is more fierce than that on individual acts of dugnad participation, prosocial 
unselfish participation may increase (cf. Boyd, Gintis, Bowles & Richerson, 2003; Rachlin, 




behavior, an adaptive practice such as dugnad participation can be strengthened in the short run 
by social PIE-proxies provided by other participants. In the absence of data, we can only cite 
anecdotal evidence from the first author’s experience with dugnad organization, which supports 
that increased emphasis on the possibility to access immediate advantageous PIE-proxies, such 
as pleasant social interactions, increases dugnad participation. Housing cooperative dugnads 
announced as invitations to social gatherings with popular food and drinks and in a pleasant 
setting that involve an explicitly voluntary common clearance of shared space have attracted an 
increased number of participants, even including former residents of the building.   
Given that housing cooperatives are not allowed to fine people for not participating in 
dugnad, some cooperatives have attempted to encourage dugnad participation by introducing a 
fee that all owners must pay every month. Those who participate in dugnad will be reimbursed 
the fee. Whether this has any effect on the attendance in dugnad is unknown. Personal benefits of 
the non-cooperative behavior may outcompete the disadvantages of paying the fee and being 
reimbursed may not reinforce dugnad participation. In Norway, many activities in schools and 
sports clubs are based on dugnad, and often the survival of a sports club is dependent on 
voluntary work. Often, the same people or parents do the lion’s share of the dugnad activities. To 
reverse this negative trend, some clubs have updated their membership rules to state that it is 
expected that all members (or their parents) contribute to different organizational activities 
throughout the year. Instead of merely asking who would like to join in or taking for granted that 
people will contribute to arranging, for example, a sporting competition, membership is now 
sometimes contingent on participation in such activities.  
The increased number of choices challenges traditional voluntary organizations because 




physically meeting. Examples of such PIE-proxies are “likes” in social media. The emergence of 
the social network community also contributes to new forms of individual involvement and 
participation. Crowdsourcing and crowdfunding are modern offspring of dugnad. Wikipedia is 
an example of dugnad (Sejersted, 2010) that involves neither physical work nor meeting other 
people face-to-face. The use of the term dugnad in Norwegian has, during the last decades, been 
extended to include digital cooperation, where the physical and social aspects are different from 
those in community gatherings. Not only is no face-to-face meeting involved, but there is not 
necessarily a predefined start- or end-point for the activity. Today, the use of the term dugnad in 
such new areas of application coexists with the traditional use (Kagge, 2019). Possibly, voluntary 
work that does not traditionally meet the criteria of dugnad is now often advertised as dugnad 
due to the positive association of the term with Nordic values.  
Increasing cultural diversity due to globalization and immigration brings along multiple 
challenges, including challenges for dugnad and other kinds of voluntary work. Newcomers to 
Norwegian society who did not grow up with Norwegian values and norms reflected in dugnad 
may have difficulty understanding why one should participate in this unfamiliar practice.   
Final Remarks  
Dugnad is often mentioned as a core practice in Norwegian culture, having roots back to 
early Christianity. Despite this, there has been little research on the topic (Lorentzen & Dugstad, 
2011). Almost all Norwegians, including immigrants, have a relationship to dugnad and a 
spontaneous understanding of what it means, and many people take initiation and participation 
for granted. This may be one of the reasons for the lack of research on dugnad. Despite changing 
societal conditions, dugnad is still important in Norwegian culture. Modern society, 




opportunities for the dugnad tradition. This development creates major challenges for some of 
today’s organizations, which must adapt to changes in both dugnad participation and form.   
Paying attention to ontogenetic processes of behavior selection enables us to recognize 
the complexity of the dynamic and flexible processes that construct social systems. This 
approach prevents us from taking one of two extreme positions. First, it circumvents a mere 
focus on a behavior-environment mismatch (as evident in Buss, 2005, a representative textbook 
on evolutionary psychology). Focus on the behavior-environment mismatch depicts evolved 
behavior as rigid in an ontogenetic timeframe. Second, the ontogenetic selection approach 
presented here prevents viewing individual organisms as creator-like agents who freely cause 
their own behavior in unpredictable ways (as evident in, e.g., Lindholm, 2012).  
Scholars (e.g., Sennett, 2012; Turchin, 2007; Wilson, 2015) have suggested that a lack of 
cooperation between and amongst societies lies behind many crises of the 21st century. If this is 
true, further interpretation of structures inducing cooperative behavior in well-working societies 
is a promising endeavor. Contrary to regarding individual organisms as freely acting initiators of 
their behavior, the analysis of variables that affect behavior during ontogeny carries the potential 
of predicting and changing behavior. Dugnad is associated with values of generosity and 
collective care. Possibly, the dugnad tradition can contribute to the search for tools for nurturing 
environments. Everyone benefits from a well-cared-for community, and participation in dugnad 
might strengthen bonds, maintain communities, and nurture a nation. An analysis of these 
variables may generate hypotheses about what environmental aspects induce cooperation. For 
example, we hypothesize that access to relatively immediate advantageous PIEs, such as those 




empirically whether the increase of prosocial activities requires an increase of access to 
immediate advantageous PIEs at the outset.  
In this paper, we have described dugnad and its origin as an example of a nurturing 
environment that promotes prosocial behavior. We have concentrated on the identification of 
functional relations between dugnad activities and PIEs and discussed dugnad in a behavioral 
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